Hiring Doctors in E-Healthcare With Zero Budget by Singh, Vikash Kumar et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
6.
08
59
0v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
 Fe
b 2
01
8
1
Hiring Doctors in E-Healthcare With Zero Budget
Vikash Kumar Singh, Sajal Mukhopadhyay, Rantu Das
Abstract—The doctors (or expert consultants) are the critical
resources on which the success of critical medical cases are
heavily dependent. With the emerging technologies (such as
video conferencing, smartphone, etc.) this is no longer a dream
but a fact, that for critical medical cases in a hospital, expert
consultants from around the world could be hired, who may be
present physically or virtually. Earlier, this interesting situation
of taking the expert consultancies from outside the hospital had
been studied, but under monetary perspective. In this paper, for
the first time, to the best of our knowledge, we investigate the
situation, where the below income group (BIG) people of the
society may be served efficiently through the expert consultancy
by the renowned doctors from outside of the hospital under zero
budget. This will help us saving many lives which will fulfil the
present day need of biomedical research. We propose three mech-
anisms: Random pick-assign mechanism (RanPAM), Truthful
optimal allocation mechanism (TOAM), and Truthful optimal
allocation mechanism for incomplete preferences (TOAM-IComP)
to allocate the doctor to the patient. With theoretical analysis,
we demonstrate that the TOAM is strategy-proof, and exhibits a
unique core property. The mechanisms are also validated with
exhaustive experiments.
Index Terms—E-Healthcare, hiring experts, core allocation,
truthful.
I. INTRODUCTION
C
ONSIDERING the diverse potential application areas
of crowdsourcing [1], [2] especially of participatory
sensing (PS) [3]–[5], e-healthcare system, which is emerging
as one of the most upcoming technologies to provide an
efficient and automated healthcare infrastructure, can employ
the crowdsourcing technology to enhance the services pro-
vided in that environment. Healthcare consultation (as for
example consultation from physician, paediatricians, plastic
and cosmetic surgeons, etc.) is said to be the crux of medical
unit and operation suite. Earlier there had been some works
to schedule the internal staffs of a medical unit (may be very
large) for working in the operation theatre or controlling the
outdoor units. Most of the literature works on scheduling the
internal staffs (inside the hospital) of the medical unit have
been devoted to hospital nurses [6]–[9] and the physicians
(or doctors) [10], [11]. The doctors are considered as the
scarce resource in the medical unit. Scheduling doctors inside
a hospital during the critical operations is a challenging task. In
[10]–[13] the different methods of scheduling a physician in an
emergency case (may be critical operation) are discussed and
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presented. Several companies have developed some physician
scheduling softwares [14]–[17] that will schedule the physi-
cians inside the hospital. However, it is observed that, with the
unprecedented growth of the communication media (specially
Internet), it may be a common phenomena to hire expert
medical staffs (especially doctors) for a critical operation from
outside of the medical unit where the operation is taking place.
This event of hiring an external expert is a special case of
crowdsourcing [1], [2] and participatory sensing [3], [18]. In
our future references, hospital, medical unit, organizations will
be used interchangeably.
In the past, operation theatre (OT) planning and scheduling
problem [19]–[21] have been a major area of interest for
researchers from various fields and is still an active area of
research. However, one scenario that may be considered as
a research area in healthcare is, say; during an operation,
how to hire a well qualified personnel, including doctors,
for a consultation. The challenges come from the following
issues: (1) which doctors can be hired? (2) How to motivate
the doctors to take part in the system as they may be very
busy? (3) If the incentives are provided, how much can be
offered? (4) If some renowned doctors are made themselves
available for social work, how to grab the situation so that
poorest people may be served efficiently to save their valuable
life? In our recent work [22], we have endeavoured solving
the problem of hiring one or more expert(s) from outside of
the hospital for a critical operations answering some issues
related to the challenges mentioned in points 1, 2, and 3.
In [22] incentives were provided to motivate the doctors for
their participation. However, it may be the case, that due
to some social awareness, some doctors may impart some
social services to the downtrodden community. This situation
is mentioned in point 4. In this paper, to the best of our
knowledge, first time we have tried to address the practical
situation discussed in point 4 above in a game theoretic
settings with the robust concept mechanism design without
money (MDWM) or under zero budget environment [23]–[26].
In our paper, we have considered n hospitals as shown
in Fig. 1. In each hospital several patients for a particular
category (say for example gastric ulcer) are admitted who
need expert consultation. The patients are of different income
groups. Some of the patients may not be able to bear the cost of
hiring expert consultation from outside the hospital. However,
it may be the case that, due to some social awareness, several
doctors throughout the world, may be available freely once
in a while (e.g. once in a week). We have assumed that, at a
particular time more than n number of doctors are available.
They give their willingness to participate in the consultation
process to some third party (platform). The third party selects
n doctors out of all doctors available based on the quality of
the doctors. Now the question is how to use the expert
2P❛t✐❡♥ts ❉♦❝t♦rs
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
n
.
.
.
P❧❛t❢♦r♠
1
2
3
.
.
.
n
Fig. 1. System model
consultations that are available freely. In this situation, each
hospital selects one patient based on their income group
(whoever has lowest income), who will be considered for free
consultation shown on the left side in Fig. 1. Thus, we have
n patients available for n doctors for a particular category
(say for paediatric). In this paper, we have first time proposed
mechanisms motivated by [23], [24], [27], [28] to allocate
the doctors to the patients so that they will be happy. By
happy we mean that each of the participating patients gets
their best possible doctor from the available doctors at the
time of allocation.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• First time the problem of hiring doctors is cast as a without
money problem or in zero budget environment.
• The truthful mechanisms are proposed for allocating the
doctors to the patients.
• The simulations are performed for comparing our schemes
with a carefully designed benchmark scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
In section II we describe the system model and formulate
the problem as MDWM. In section III, we present two
mechanisms: Random pick-assign mechanism (RanPAM) and
Truthful optimal allocation mechanism (TOAM). Section IV
presents the more general set-up in matching market and the
mechanism to tackle the more general set-up namely Truthful
optimal allocation mechanism for incomplete preferences
(TOAM-IComP). A detailed analysis of the experimental
results is carried out in section V. Finally, we present a
summary of our work and highlight some future directions in
section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the scenario where n distinct expert consultants
providing their consultancy to n different Below Income Group
(BIG) patients. One hospital provides one BIG patient for the
category under consideration. A platform acts as a third party
and decides the patient − doctor allocation pair. Here, we
assume that each hospital needs exactly one expert consultant
and each expert consultant can provide their service to one
hospital at a time. The case that each hospital need multiple ex-
pert consultants is left as our future work. In our model, expert
consultation may be sought for several categories of diseases.
The set of such categories is denoted by x = {x1, x2, . . . , xk}.
The set of sets of available expert consultants in k different
categories is given as S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sk}; where Si denote
the set of available expert consultants for a particular category
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and is given as Si = {s
xi
1
, sxi
2
, . . . , sxin }. The
set of sets of available patients in k different categories is given
as P = {P1,P2, . . . ,Pk}; where Pi is the set of available BIG
agents for a particular category i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and is given
as Pi = {p
xi
1
, pxi
2
, . . . , pxin }. When i
th category is mentioned,
the index will be assumed as i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, otherwise
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Each agent pxii ∈ Pi has a strict preference
ordering over all sxii ∈ Si. The strict preference ordering of
tth agent pxit ∈ Pi in i
th category is denoted by ≻it over the
set Si, where s
xi
1
≻it s
xi
2
means that in ith category, t prefers
sxi
1
to sxi
2
. The set of preferences of all agents in k different
categories is denoted by ≻= {≻1,≻2, . . . ,≻k}. Where, ≻i is
the preference of all the agents in ith category over all the doc-
tors in Si, represented as ≻i= {≻i1,≻
i
2
, . . . ,≻in}. Given the
preference of the agents, our proposed mechanisms allocates
one doctor to one patient. Let us denote such an allocation
vector by A = {A1,A2, . . . ,Ak}; where, each allocation
vector Ai ∈ A denotes the allocation vector of agents belongs
to the ith category denoted as Ai = {ai1, a
i
2
, . . . , ain}; where,
each ait ∈ Ai is a (p
xi
t , s
xi
j ) pair. Initially, one doctor is
allocated to one patient randomly without loss of generality.
III. PROPOSED MECHANISMS
In this section, we have developed two algorithms motivated
by [23] [24] [26]. The first one i.e. RanPAM is given as a naive
solution of our problem, that will help to understand better, the
more robust Dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC)
mechanism i.e. TOAM presented next.
A. Random Pick-Assign Mechanism (RanPAM)
To better understand the model first we propose a random-
ized algorithm called RanPAM to assign doctors to the patients
in the hospitals. The RanPAM consists of two stage allocation
mechanism, namely; Main, and RanPAM allocation. The idea
behind the construction of the Main is to capture all the k
categories present in the system. In each iteration of the for
loop in line 2-5, a call to RanPAM allocation is made. In line
6, the final allocation A is returned. Considering the RanPAM
allocation, from line 3 it is clear that the algorithm terminates
once the list of patients in xi category becomes empty. In
line 4, the rand() function returns the index of the randomly
selected patient and is stored in variable j. In line 5, the p∗
data structure holds the patient present at the index returned
in line 4.
Algorithm 1 Main (S, P , x, ≻)
Output: A ← φ
1: begin
2: for each xi ∈ x do
3: Ai ← RanPAM allocation(Si, Pi, ≻
i)
4: A ← A ∪ Ai
5: end for
6: return A
7: end
3In line 6, a doctor is randomly selected from the patient j’s
preference list and is held in s∗ data structure. Line 7 maintains
the selected patient-doctor pairs of xi category in Ai. Line
8 and 9 removes the selected patients and selected doctors
from the system. Line 10 removes the selected doctor from
the preference lists of the remaining patients. In line 11, the
p∗ and s∗ are set to φ. The RanPAM allocation returns the
final patient-doctor allocation pair set Ai.
Algorithm 2 RanPAM allocation (Si, Pi, ≻i)
Output: Ai ← φ
1: begin
2: j ← 0, p∗ ← φ, s∗ ← φ
3: while Pi 6= φ do
4: j ← rand(Pi)
5: p∗ ← pxij
6: s∗ ← random(≻ij)
7: Ai ← Ai ∪ (p
∗, s∗)
8: Pi ← Pi \ p
∗
9: Si ← Si \ s
∗
10: ≻ik ← ≻
i
k \ s
∗, ∀k ∈ Pi
11: p∗ ← φ, s∗ ← φ
12: end while
13: return Ai
14: end
− Upper Bound Analysis:
The time taken by the RanPAM is the sum of running times
for each statement executed. Considering the Main(), it can
be seen that line 2-5 will execute for k times. In RanPAM
allocation, line 2 is bounded by the constant time. In line 3,
the test is executed (n + 1) times, as their are n patients in
Pi . For each execution of while loop, line 4 − 9 will take
constant amount of time; whereas line 10 is bounded above
by n. The overall time complexity of the RanPAM is mainly
contributed by the while loop in line 3-12. Mathematically, the
upper bound on the RanPAM for all the k categories is given
as:
T (n) =
k∑
i=1
(
1 +
(
n∑
i=1
i− 1
))
=
(
k∑
i=1
1
)
+
(
k∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
i− 1
)
≤
(
k∑
i=1
1
)
+
(
k∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
i
)
= k +
k∑
i=1
n(n+ 1)
2
= k +
kn(n+ 1)
2
=
kn2 + k(n+ 2)
2
T (n) = O
(
kn2
)
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− Essential properties:
There are two essential properties that will help to develop
the further mechanisms in our paper. The two properties
are: Blocking coalition and Core allocation. These properties
captures the fundamental idea: can we design a system where
agents cannot gain by manipulating their preferences that are
only known to them?
• Blocking coalition. For every Ti ⊂ Pi let Ai(Ti) = {u ∈
Ai : u
p
xi
i
i ∈ Ti, ∀i ∈ Ti} denote the set of allocations
that can be achieved by the agents in Ti trading among
themselves alone. Given an allocation a ∈ Ai, a set Ti ⊆
Pi of agents is called a blocking coalition (for a), if there
exists a u ∈ A(T ) such that ∀i ∈ T either ui ≻i ai or
ui = ai and at least one agent is better off i.e. for at
least one j ∈ Ti we have uj ≻j aj .
• Core allocation. This property exhibits the fact that the
allocation will be free of blocking coalition. In other
words it says that if any subset of agents form a coalition
and reallocates themselves via some internal reallocation,
all of the members of the coalition can’t be better off.
− Drawback:
From the perspective of blocking coalition, it can be concluded
that the RanPAM is suffering from the blocking coalition. This
leads to the violation of one of the economic properties in
MDWM environment named as core allocation.
B. Truthful Optimal Allocation Mechanism (TOAM)
The proposed truthful mechanism needs to overcome several
non-trivial challenges: firstly, the patients preferences are un-
known and need to be reported in a truthful manner; secondly,
the allocation of doctors made to the patients must satisfy
the core. The previously discussed RanPAM mechanism failed
to handle such challenges. To overcome these challenges, in
this paper a truthful mechanism is proposed which is termed
as TOAM. Along with, truthfulness, TOAM satisfies Pareto
Optimality (defined later). The main idea of the TOAM is
to develop a mechanism where the agents can’t gain by
manipulation. If there is no manipulation we can reach to the
equilibrium of the system very quickly and the market become
stable. The TOAM satisfies two useful properties mentioned
in the previous subsection. The two properties are:
• Truthfulness or DSIC. Let Ai =M(≻ii,≻
i
−i) and Aˆi =
M(≻ˆ
i
i,≻
i
−i). TOAM is truthful if a(i)
i ii aˆ(i)
i, for all
pxii ∈ Pi.
• Pareto optimality. An allocation Ai is pareto optimal if
there exists no allocation aij ∈ Ai such that any patient
pxii ∈ a
i
j can make themselves better off without making
other patient(s) pxik ∈ a
i
k worse off.
− Sketch of the TOAM:
More formally, the proposed TOAM, unlike the previous
mechanism, can be thought of as a four stage allocation mech-
anism: Main routine, Graph initialization, Graph creation and
Cycle detection.
a) Main routine: The main idea behind the construction
of main routine is to capture all the k categories present
in the system. The input to the main routine are the set of
sets of vertices representing all the available patients given as
C = {C1, C2, . . . , Ck}; where Ci = {c
xi
1
, cxi
2
, . . . , cxin } is the
set of vertices representing patients belonging to xi category,
the set of sets of vertices representing all the available expert
4consultants (doctors) given as Q = {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qk}; where
Qi = {q
xi
1
, qxi
2
, . . . , qxin } is the set of vertices representing
doctors belonging to xi category, and x represents the set of
categories. The output of the main routine is the allocation
set A. In Line 4, the C∗ data structure temporarily holds the
set of vertices returned by select() in xi category. The Q∗
data structure temporarily holds the set of vertices returned
by select() in xi category as depicted in line 5. In line 6
for each category xi, a call to graph initialization is made
to randomly allocate a doctor to each patient. The allocation
set A maintains the allocation for each category in line 7. In
line 9, the final allocation set A is returned.
Algorithm 3 Main routine (C, Q, x, ≻)
Output: A ← φ
1: begin
2: Q∗ ← φ, C∗ ← φ
3: for each xi ∈ x do
4: C∗ ← select(C)
5: Q∗ ← select(Q)
6: Ai ← Graph initialization (C
∗, Q∗, ≻i)
7: A ← A ∪ Ai
8: end for
9: return A
10: end
b) Graph initialization: The input to the graph initial-
ization phase are the set of vertices representing the patients in
xi category i.e. Ci, the set of vertices representing the doctors
in xi category i.e.Qi, and the preference profile of the patients
in xi category. The output of the graph initialization is the
graph G in the form of adjacency matrix F representing the
randomly allocated doctors to the patients. Line 2, initializes
the adjacency matrix F of size |Vi|∗ |Vi| to null matrix; where
Vi = Ci ∪ Qi.
Algorithm 4 Graph initialization (Ci, Qi, ≻i)
1: begin
2: F = {0}|Vi |∗|Vi|
3: for each vertex c
xi
t ∈ Ci do
4: q∗ ← Select_random(Qi)
5: F
q∗,c
xi
t
= 1
6: Qi ← Qi \ q
∗
7: end for
8: Graph creation (Ci, Qi, F , ≻
i)
9: end
The for loop in line 3 iterates over all the patients in the
xi category. In line 4, the Select_random() function takes the
set of vertices Qi (analogous to the doctors with xi expertise
area) as the input and returns the randomly selected vertex.
The randomly selected vertex is held in q∗ data structure. Line
5, places a directed edge from q∗ to cxit . Line 6, removes the
randomly allocated vertex held in q∗ from Qi. In line 8, a call
to Graph creation phase is done.
c) Graph creation: The input to the graph creation
phase are the set of vertices representing the patients in xi
category i.e. Ci, the set of vertices representing the doctors in
xi category i.e.Qi, the adjacency matrix F , and the preference
profile of the patients in xi category. The output of the graph
creation is the adjacency matrix F . In line 3, the Select_best()
function takes the strict preference ordering list of tth agent as
input and returns the best doctor from the available preference
list. The q∗ data structure holds the best selected doctor. Line
4 places a directed edge from cxit ∈ Ci to q
∗ ∈ Qi. In line 6,
a call to Optimal allocation phase is done.
Algorithm 5 Graph creation (Ci, Qi, F , ≻i)
1: begin
2: for each vertex c
xi
t ∈ Ci do
3: q∗ ← Select_best(≻it)
4: Fcxit ,q∗
= 1
5: end for
6: Optimal allocation (Ci, Qi, F)
7: end
d) Optimal allocation: The next challenge is to
determine a finite cycle in a directed graph G. The input
to the optimal allocation phase are the set of vertices
representing the patients in xi category i.e. Ci, the set of
vertices representing the doctors in xi category i.e.Qi, and the
adjacency matrix F returned from the previous stage. Initially,
in line 3-5 all cxik ∈ Ci and q
xi
j ∈ Qi are marked unvisited. In
line 6 a random vertex from set Vi is selected and is captured
by pi data structure. Line 7 marks the vertex in pi as visited.
The vertex in pi is pushed into the stack S using line 8. Now,
Line 9− 25, computes a finite directed cycle in the graph by
following the outgoing arcs. Line 26, reallocates as suggested
by directed cycle. Each patient on a directed cycle gets the
expert consultant better than the expert consultant it initially
points to or the initially pointed expert consultant. Line 27-38
removes the patients and doctors that were reallocated in the
previous step from the available patients and doctors lists
respectively and updates the adjacency matrix. Line 42-50
updates the available patient and doctors list, preference
list of the patients, and the adjacency matrix. A call is
made to the graph creation phase to generate the updated
graph from the available number of patients and the expert
consultants until the patients set and doctor sets are not empty.
− Several properties of TOAM:
The proposed TOAM has several compelling properties.
These properties are discussed next.
• Running time The running time of TOAM will be
the sum of the running time of main routine, graph
initialization, graph creation, and optimal allocation phases.
Line 2 of the main routine is bounded by O(1). The for loop
in line 3 executes for k + 1 times. Line 4-5 are bounded by
O(1) for each iteration of the for loop. Line 6, takes the
time equal to the time taken by graph initialize mechanism.
For the time being, let the graph initialization mechanism is
bounded by O(N). Line 7 of main routine mechanism takes
O(1) time. So, the running time of main routine is bounded
by: O(1)+O(kN) +O(1) = O(kN). In graph initialization,
in each execution of the for loop an edge is placed between
the two vertices of the graph G.
5Algorithm 6 Optimal allocation (Ci, Qi, F )
1: begin
2: S ← φ, π ← φ, Cˆ∗ ← φ, Qˆ∗ ← φ
3: for each c
xi
k ∈ Ci and q
xi
j ∈ Qi do
4: Mark c
xi
k ← unvisited, q
xi
j ← unvisited
5: end for
6: π ← random(Vi)
7: Mark π ← visited
8: push(S, π)
9: while S is non-empty do
10: π ← pop(S)
11: for each π′ adjacent to π do
12: if π′ is unvisited then
13: Mark π′ ← visited
14: push(S, π′)
15: else if π′ is visited then
16: Exists a finite cycle.
17: for each c
xi
k in finite cycle do
18: Cˆ∗ ← Cˆ∗ ∪ {cxik }
19: end for
20: for each q
xi
j in finite cycle do
21: Qˆ∗ ← Qˆ∗ ∪ {qxij }
22: end for
23: end if
24: end for
25: end while
26: Allocate each patient in cycle a doctor it points to.
27: Ci ← Ci \ Cˆ
∗
28: Qi ← Qi \ Qˆ
∗
29: for each c
xi
k ∈ Cˆ
∗ do
30: for each q
xi
j ∈ Qˆ
∗ do
31: if Fcxi
k
,q
xi
j
== 1 then
32: Fcxi
k
,q
xi
j
= 0
33: end if
34: if F
q
xi
j
,c
xi
k
== 1 then
35: F
q
xi
j
,c
xi
k
= 0
36: end if
37: end for
38: end for
39: Vi = Qi ∪ Ci ⊲ Vi is updated
40: if Vi 6= φ then
41: ≻i ← φ
42: for all c
xi
k ∈ Ci do
43: ≻ik←≻
i
k \Qˆ
∗ ⊲ Removes doctors present in Qˆ∗ from
patient’s k preference list.
44: ≻i ← ≻i ∪ ≻ik
45: for all q
xi
j ∈ Qˆ
∗ do
46: if F
c
xi
k
,q
xi
j
== 1 then
47: F
c
xi
k
,q
xi
j
= 0
48: end if
49: end for
50: end for
51: Graph creation (Ci, Qi, F , ≻
i)
52: end if
53: end
Generating a directed graph G using line 3 − 7 takes
O(n) time. Next, line 10 is bounded by the time taken
by the graph creation mechanism. In the graph creation
algorithm, the for loop contributes the major part of the
running time i.e. O(n). Line 6 of graph creation is bounded
by the time taken by optimal allocation. For the time being
let the time taken by by the optimal allocation be O(M).
So, the running time of graph creation algorithm is bounded
by: O(1) + O(n) + O(M). In, optimal allocation algorithm
line 2 is bounded by O(1). The total number of vertex is
n + n = 2n, so the outer for loop will take O(n). Line
6 − 8, is bounded by O(1). the total number iterations
of the innermost while loop of optimal allocation cannot
exceed the number of edges in G, and thus the size of
S cannot exceed n. The while loop of optimal allocation
algorithm is bounded by O(n). Line 26− 28, are executed in
constant time O(1). Line 29 − 38 of the mechanism can be
executed in worst case O(n2). Line 42-50 in worst case is
bounded by O(n). The running time of optimal allocation is:
O(n)+O(1)+O(n2)+O(1)+O(n) = O(n2). Total running
time of TOAM: O(n) + O(n2) = O(n2). Considering the k
categories simultaneously we have O(kn2).
• DSIC The second property, that distinguishes the proposed
TOAM from any direct revelation allocation mechanism is
its DSIC property. In TOAM, the strict preference ordering
revealed by the agents in any category xi ∈ x over the set
of doctors Si are unknown or private to the agents. As the
strict preference ordering is private, any agent i belonging
to category xj ∈ x can misreport their private information
to make themselves better off. TOAM, an obvious direct
revelation mechanism claims that agents in any category
i ∈ 1 . . . k cannot make themselves better off by misreporting
their private valuation, i.e. TOAM is DSIC.
Theorem 1. The TOAM is DSIC.
Proof. The truthfulness of the TOAM is based on the fact that
each agent i gets the best possible choice from the reported
strict preference, irrespective of the category i ∈ 1 . . . k of
the agent i. It is to be noted that, the third party (or the plat-
form) partition the available patients and doctors into different
sets based on their category. The partitioning of doctors set
S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sk} is independent of the partitioning of
the available patients into the set P = {P1,P2, . . . ,Pk}. So,
if we select the patient set Pi ∈ P and the doctor set Si ∈ S
randomly from category xi ∈ x and show that for any agent
pxii ∈ Pi misreporting the private information (in this case
strict preference over Si) will not make the agent p
xi
i better-
off, then its done. Our claim is that, if any agent belonging to
xi category, cannot be better off by misreporting their strict
preference, then no agent from any category can be better off
by misreporting the strict preference.
Fix category xi. Let us assume that, if all the agents in
xi are reporting truthfully, then all the agents gets a doctor
till the end of mth iteration. From the construction of the
mechanism in each iteration of the TOAM, at least a cycle
Ωi ∈ Ω is selected. The set of cycles chosen by the TOAM
in m iterations are: Ω = (Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,Ωm), where Ωi is the
cycle chosen by the TOAM in the ith iteration, when agents
reporting truthfully. Each agent in Ω1, gets its first choice and
hence no strategic agent can be benefited by misreporting.
From the construction of the mechanism, no agent in Ωi will
ever be pointed by any agents in Ω1, . . . ,Ωi−1; if this is not
the case, then agent i could have been belong to one of the
previously selected cycle.
Once the doctor is allocated to the agent, the mechanism
6remove the agent along with the allocated doctor, and the strict
preference list of the remaining agents are updated. Since,
agent i gets its first choice outside of the doctors allocated in
Ω1, . . . ,Ωi−1, it has no incentive to misreport. Thus, whatever
agent i reports, agent i will not receive a doctor owned by an
agent in Ω1, . . . ,Ωi−1. Since, the TOAM gives agent i its
favourite doctor outside the selected cycle till now. Hence,
agent i did not gain by misreporting the strict preference
ordering. From our claim it must be true for any agents in
any category i ∈ 1 . . . k. Hence, TOAM is DSIC.

• Core allocation The third property exhibited by the
proposed TOAM is related to the uniqueness of the resultant
allocation or in some sense optimality. The term used to
determine the optimal allocation of TOAM is termed as unique
core allocation. The claim is that, the allocation computed by
the proposed TOAM is the unique core allocation.
Theorem 2. The allocation computed by TOAM is the unique
core allocation.
Proof. The proof of unique core allocation for any category
xi ∈ x can be thought of as divided into two parts. First, it is
proved that the allocation vector Ai computed by TOAM for
any category xi ∈ x is a core allocation. Once the allocation
vector in xi category is proved to be The core, the uniqueness
of the core allocation for xi is taken into consideration. Our
claim is that, if the allocation Ai computed by TOAM for any
arbitrary xi ∈ x is a unique core allocation, then the allocation
computed by TOAM for all xi ∈ x will be a unique core
allocation.
Fix category xi. In order to prove the allocation computed
by TOAM is a core allocation, consider an arbitrary sets of
agents S∗, such that S∗ ⊆ P . Let Ωi is the cycle chosen
by TOAM in the ith iteration and δ(Ωi) is the set of agents
allocated a doctor, when reporting truthfully. When TOAM
will allocate the agents, at some cycle Ωk, i ∈ S
∗ will be
included for the first time. In that case δ(Ωk) ∩ S∗ 6= φ. As
any agent i ∈ S∗ is being included for the first time, it can
be said that no other agent in S∗ is included in the cycles
Ω1, . . . ,Ωk−1. As the TOAM allocates the favourite doctor to
any arbitrary agent i ∈ δ(Ωk) outside the doctors allocated to
δ(Ω1), . . . , δ(Ωk−1), it can be concluded that i ∈ δ(Ωk) and
i ∈ S∗ such that δ(Ωk) ∩ S∗ 6= φ gets his favourite doctor at
the kth iteration. Hence no internal reallocation can provide
a better doctor to any agent i ∈ S∗. Inductively, the same is
true for any agent j ∈ S∗ that will satisfy δ(Ωk) ∩ S∗ 6= φ.
Now, we prove uniqueness. In TOAM, each agent in Ω1
receives the best possible doctor from his preference list. Any
core allocation must also do the same thing, otherwise the
agents who didn’t get the first choice could be better off with
internal reallocation. So the core allocation agrees with the
TOAM allocation for the agents in δ(Ω1). Now in TOAM,
as all the agents in δ(Ω2) get their favourite doctors outside
the set of doctors allocated to the agents δ(Ω1), any core
allocation must be doing the same allocation, otherwise the
agents in δ(Ω2) who didn’t get their favourite choice can
internally reallocate themselves in a better way. In this way we
can inductively conclude that the core allocation must follow
the TOAM allocation. This proves the uniqueness of TOAM.
Hence, it is proved that the allocation by TOAM for
category xi is a unique core allocation. From our claim it
must be true for any agents in categories i . . . k. Hence,the
allocation computed by TOAM for any category xi ∈ x is the
unique core allocation. 
− Correctness of the TOAM:
The correctness of the TOAM mechanism is proved with the
loop invariant technique [29] [30]. The loop invariant: At the
start of jth iteration, the number of patient-doctor pairs to be
explored are n−
∑j−1
i=1 ki in a category, where ki is the number
of patient-doctor pairs processed at the ith iteration. Precisely,
it is to be noted that n −
∑j−1
i=1 ki ≤ n. From definition of
ki, it is clear that the term ki is non-negative. The number of
patient-doctor pairs could be atleast 0. Hence, satisfying the
inequality n−
∑j−1
i=1 ki ≤ n. We must show three things for
this loop invariant to be true.
Initialization: It is true prior to the first iteration of the
loop. Just before the first iteration of the while loop, in optimal
allocation mechanism n −
∑j−1
i=1 ki ≤ n ⇒ n − 0 ≤ n i.e.
no patient-doctor pair is explored apriori in, say ith category.
This confirms that Ai contains no patient-doctor pair.
Maintenance: For the loop invariant to be true, if it
is true before each iteration of while loop, it remains true
before the next iteration. The body of while loop allocates
doctor(s) to the patient(s) with each doctor is allocated to
one patient present in the detected cycle; i.e. each time Ai is
incremented or each time n is decremented by ki. Just before
the jth iteration the number of patient-doctor pairs allocated
are
∑j−1
i=1 ki, implies that the number of patient-doctor pairs
left are: n−
∑j−1
i=1 ki ≤ n. After the j
th iteration, two cases
may arise:
Case 1: If kj = n−
∑j−1
i=1 ki
In this case, all the kj patient-doctor pairs will be exhausted
in the jth iteration and no patient-doctor pair is left for
the next iteration. The inequality n − (
∑j−1
i=1 ki + kj) =
(n −
∑j−1
i=1 ki) − kj = (n −
∑j−1
i=1 ki) − (n −
∑j−1
i=1 ki) =
0 ≤ n.
Case 2: If kj < n−
∑j−1
i=1 ki
In this case, jth iteration allocates few patient-doctor pairs
from the remaining patient-doctor pairs; leaving behind some
of the pairs for further iterations. So, the inequality n −
(
∑j−1
i=1 ki + kj) ≤ n = n−
∑j
i=1 ki ≤ n is satisfied.
From Case 1 and Case 2, at the end of jth iteration the loop
invariant is satisfied.
Termination: In each iteration at least one patient-doctor
pair is formed. This indicates that at some (j + 1)th iteration
the loop terminates and in line no. 9, S is exhausted,
otherwise the loop would have continued. As the loop
terminates and S is exhausted in (j + 1)th iteration. We can
say n−
∑j
i=1 ki = 0 ≤ n. Thus indicates that all the n agents
are processed and each one has a doctor assigned when the
loop terminates.
− Illustrative example:
The number of patients is n = 5 i.e. P2 =
7{px2
1
, px2
2
, px2
3
, px2
4
, px2
5
} and the number of expert consultant
(or doctors) is n = 5 S2 = {s
x2
1
, sx2
2
, sx2
3
, sx2
4
, sx2
5
}. The
strict preference ordering given by the patient set P2 is: p
x2
1
:
(sx2
2
, sx2
4
, sx2
3
, sx2
1
, sx2
5
); px2
2
: (sx2
3
, sx2
4
, sx2
5
, sx2
1
, sx2
2
); px2
3
:
(sx2
2
, sx2
3
, sx2
1
, sx2
4
, sx2
5
); px2
4
: (sx2
5
, sx2
2
, sx2
3
, sx2
4
, sx2
1
); px2
5
:
(sx2
1
, sx2
4
, sx2
2
, sx2
3
, sx2
5
). Following the graph initialization
phase a directed edge is placed between the following pairs:
{(sx2
1
, px2
1
), (sx2
2
, px2
2
), (sx2
3
, px2
3
), (sx2
4
, px2
4
), and(sx2
5
, px2
5
)}.
Now, Following the graph creation phase, say, a patient px2
1
is selected from P2. As, s
x2
2
is the most preferred doctor in
the preference list of px2
1
. So, a directed edge is placed from
px2
1
to sx2
2
. The for loop of the graph creation phase places
a directed edge between the remaining patients in P2 and the
most prefered doctors in S2, resulting in a directed graph.
Now, running the optimal allocation phase on the directed
graph a cycle (px2
2
, sx2
3
, px2
3
, sx2
2
, px2
2
) is determined. Similarly,
the remaining patients P2 = {p
x2
1
, px2
4
, px2
5
} will be allocated
a doctor. The final allocation of patient − doctor pair are:
{(px2
1
, sx2
4
), (px2
2
, sx2
3
), (px2
3
, sx2
2
), (px2
4
, sx2
5
), (px2
5
, sx2
1
)}.
IV. MORE GENERAL SETTING
Till now, for simplicity in any category xi we have con-
sidered the set-up where the number of patients and number
of doctors are same i.e. n along with an extra constraint that
the patients are providing the strict preference ordering over
all the available expert consultants. But, one can think of the
situation where there are n number of patients and m number
of doctors in any given category such that m 6= n (m > n or
m < n). Moreover, the constraint that each of the patient is
providing the strict preference ordering over all the available
doctors is not essential and can be relaxed for all the three
different set-ups (i.e. m == n, m < n, and m > n). By
relaxation, we mean that the subset of the available patients
may give the strict preference ordering over the subset of the
available doctors.
A. Truthful Optimal Allocation Mechanism for InComplete
Preference (TOAM-IComP)
As an extension of TOAM the TOAM-IComP is proposed
motivated by [27] [28] to cater the need of more realistic
incomplete (or partial) preferences. It is to be noted that, along
with truthfulness the TOAM-IComP satisfies the previously
discussed two economic properties: pareto optimality and the
core.
− Sketch of the TOAM-IComP
The input to the TOAM-IComP are: the set of n available
patients in a particular category xi, the set of m available
doctors in a particular category xi, and the set of preferences
of all the patients for the available doctors in a xi category.
The output of the TOAM-IComP is the allocated patient-
doctor pairs. In line 2, all the variables and data structures
are initialized to 0 and φ respectively. In line 3-5 numbers 1
to n are captured in B data structure. Next, the generated list
B is randomized using line 6-8. Line 9-12 assigns the distinct
random numbers between 1 and n stored in B to the patients
sequentially. In line 13, the patient list Pi is sorted based on
the assigned random numbers. From line 14, it is clear that the
mechanism terminates, once the patient list becomes empty. In
line 15, using pick() function, patient is selected sequentially
based on the number assigned. Line 16 checks the preference
list of patient stored in pˆ. In line 17, the best available doctor
is selected from the selected patient preference list by using
Select_best() function. Line 18 maintains the selected patient-
doctor pairs in F data structure. Line 19 and 20 removes the
selected patients and selected doctors from their respective
preference lists. Line 22 sets pˆ and sˆ to φ. The TOAM-IComP
returns the final patient-doctor pair allocation set F .
Algorithm 7 TOAM-IComP (Si, Pi, ≻i)
Output: F ← φ.
1: begin
2: ℓ ← 0, pˆ ← φ, sˆ ← φ, B ← φ
3: for i = 1 to n do
4: B ← B ∪ {i}
5: end for
6: for i = 1 to n do
7: swap B[i] with B[Random(i, n)]
8: end for
9: for each p
xi
j ∈ Pi do
10: Assign(pxij ,B[ℓ])
11: ℓ← ℓ+ 1
12: end for
13: Pi ← Sort(Pi, B) ⊲ Sort Pi based on random number
generated.
14: while Pi 6= φ do
15: pˆ ← pick(Pi) ⊲ Sequentially picks the patients based on
the random number assigned.
16: if ≻ij 6= φ then ⊲ where, j = 1, 2, . . . , n
17: sˆ ← Select_best(≻ij)
18: F ← F ∪ (pˆ, sˆ)
19: Pi ← Pi \ pˆ
20: Si ← Si \ sˆ
21: end if
22: pˆ ← φ, sˆ ← φ
23: end while
24: return F
25: end
− Upper Bound Analysis
The random number generator in line 3-12 is motivated by
[29] and is bounded above by n. When a while loop exits in
the usual way (i.e., due to the inner loop header), the test is
executed one time more than the body of the while loop.
T (n) =
k∑
i=1
((
n∑
i=1
O(1)
)
+
(
O(n lgn)
)
+
(
n∑
i=1
O(n)
))
=
(
k∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
O(1)
)
+
(
k∑
i=1
O(n lgn)
)
+
(
k∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
O(n)
)
= O
(
k∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
1
)
+O
(
k∑
i=1
n lg n
)
+O
(
k∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
n
)
= O
(
k∑
i=1
n
)
+O
(
kn lg n
)
+O
(
k∑
i=1
n
2
)
= O
(
kn
)
+O
(
kn lgn
)
+O
(
kn
2
)
T (n) = O
(
kn
2
)


8Table I. Running time and Economic properties of the proposed mechanisms
Economic properties
Proposed mechanisms Running time The Core Truthfulness Pareto optimality
RanPAM O(kn2) ✗ ✗ ✗
TOAM O(kn2) ✓ ✓ ✓
TOAM-IComP O(kn2) ✓ ✓ ✓
In line 14, the test is executed (n + 1) times, as their are n
patients in Pi. In line 13, the sorting is done that is bounded
above by n lg n. For each execution of while loop line 14−23
will take constant amount of time.
− Illustrative example
The detailed functioning of TOAM-IComP for category x3 is
illustrated in Fig. 2. The number of patients is n = 4 and the
number of expert consultants (or doctors) is m = 3. The strict
preference ordering given by the patient set P3 is shown in
Fig. 2a. Following line 3-12 of Algorithm 6, we generate the
random numbers for the patients in P3. Now, based on the
random number assigned as shown in Fig. 2a, first the patient
px3
3
is selected and assigned expert consultant sx3
3
from his
preference list. Similarly, the remaining patients px3
1
, px3
4
, and
px3
2
are selected in the presented order.
p
x3
1
p
x3
2
p
x3
3
s
x3
1
s
x3
2
s
x3
2
s
x3
3
s
x3
1
≻
3
1
≻
3
2 ≻
3
2
s
x3
3
p
x3
4
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
s
x3
3s
x3
2
≻
3
4
(a) Strict preference ordering
p
x3
1
p
x3
2
p
x3
3
s
x3
2
p
x3
4
s
x3
1
s
x3
3
Unallocated
(b) Final allocation
Fig. 2. Detailed functioning of TOAM-IComP
The final allocation of patient − doctor pair is shown in
Figure 2b.
V. EXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS
In this section, we compare the efficacy of the proposed
mechanisms via simulations. The experiments are carried out
in this section to provide a simulation based on the data (the
strict preference ordering of the patients) generated randomly
using the Random library in Python. Our proposed naive
mechanism i.e. RanPAM is considered as a benchmark scheme
and is compared with TOAM (in case of full preferences) and
TOAM-IComP (in case of incomplete preferences).
A. Simulation set-up
For creating a real world healthcare scenario we have
considered 10 different categories of patients and doctors for
our simulation purpose. It is to be noted that, in each of the
categories, some fixed number of patients and fixed number of
doctors are present for taking consultancy and for providing
consultancy respectively.
One of the scenario that is taken into consideration for
simulation purpose is, say there are equal number of patients
and doctors present in each of the categories under consid-
eration along with the assumption that each of the patients
are providing strict preference ordering (generated randomly)
over all the available doctors in the respective categories. This
scenario is referred as Scenario-1 in the rest of the paper.
Next, the more general scenario with equal number of
patients and doctors in each of the categories can be obtained
by relaxing the constraint that all the available patients are
providing the strict preference ordering over all the available
doctors in categories under consideration. Here, it may be the
case that, in each of the categories some subset of the patients
are providing the strict preference ordering over the subset of
the available doctors. This scenario is referred as Scenario-2
in the rest of the paper.
In the series of different scenarios, next we have considered
the utmost general set-up where there are n number of patients
and m number of doctors such that m 6= n (m > n and
m < n). In this, the subset of patients are providing the strict
preference ordering over the subset of the available doctors in
each categories under consideration. The scenario with m > n
is referred as scenario-3 and the scenario with m < n is
referred as scenario-4 in the future references. The data that
is utilized for the simulation purpose in all the four scenarios
are shown in table II.
B. Performance metrics
The performance of the proposed mechanisms is measured
under the banner of two important parameters:
• Efficiency loss (EL). It is the sum of the difference between
the index of the doctor allocated from the agent preference
list to the index of the most preferred doctor by the agent
from his preference list. Mathematically, the EL is defined
as: EL =
∑n
i=1(IiA − IiMP ) where, IiA is the index of the
doctor allocated from the initially provided preference list of
the patient i, IiMP is the index of the most preferred doctor in
the initially provided preference list of patient i. Considering
the overall available categories x = {x1, x2, . . . , xk}, the total
efficiency loss (TEL) of the system is given as:
TEL =
∑
x
n∑
i=1
(I iA − IiMP ) (1)
• Number of best allocation (NBA). It measures the number
of patients (say k) gets their best choice (most preferred
doctor) from their provided preference list over the available
number of doctors. It is the sum of the number of agents get-
9Table II. Simulation data set utilized for different scenarios
Scenarios Preference profiles type (⋚) Number of Doctors (m) Number of Patients (n) Total Doctors Total Patients
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10
Scenario-1 Full preference (m = n) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 100 100
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 200 200
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 300 300
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 400 400
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 500 500
Scenario-2 Partial preference (m = n) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 100 100
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 200 200
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 300 300
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 400 400
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 500 500
Scenario-3 Partial preference (m > n) 12 9 8 13 10 7 10 11 11 9 8 6 6 10 8 5 9 7 8 8 100 75
20 15 27 21 17 19 23 21 23 14 14 10 21 17 13 15 20 16 18 11 200 155
27 27 33 36 33 24 39 21 31 29 19 21 25 22 29 20 17 14 25 28 300 220
40 41 45 41 44 32 38 36 40 43 37 34 43 37 38 27 36 32 36 40 400 360
45 55 55 50 35 50 65 40 45 60 43 53 47 45 30 49 60 35 44 56 500 462
Scenario-4 Partial preference (m < n) 8 6 6 10 8 5 9 7 8 8 12 9 8 13 10 7 10 11 11 9 75 100
14 10 21 17 13 15 20 16 18 11 20 15 27 21 17 19 23 21 23 14 155 200
19 21 25 22 29 20 17 14 25 28 27 27 33 36 33 24 39 21 31 29 220 300
37 34 43 37 38 27 36 32 36 40 40 41 45 41 44 32 38 36 40 43 360 400
43 53 47 45 30 49 60 35 44 56 45 55 55 50 35 50 65 40 45 60 462 500
ting their most preferred doctor from their provided preference
list.
C. Simulation directions
In order to analyse the effect of manipulative behaviour
of the agents on the proposed optimal mechanisms (i.e.
TOAM and TOAM-IComP), the two proposed directions are
considered: (1) When all the agents are reporting their true
preference list. (2) When subset of the agents are misreporting
their true preference list.
D. Result analysis
In this section, the result is simulated following the
directions mentioned in Subsection C. As the patients are
varying their true preference list, the next question that
comes is that, how many of the patients can vary their true
preference list (i.e. what fraction of the total available patients
can vary their true preference list?). To answer this question,
the calculation is done using indicator random variable.
−Expected amount of variation The following analysis
mathematically justifies the idea of choosing the parameters
of variation. The analysis is motivated by [29]. Let Ni be the
random variable associated with the event in which ith patient
varies his true preference ordering. Thus, Ni = {i
th patient
varies preference ordering}. We have, from the definition of
expectation that E[Ni] = Pr{ith patient varies preference
ordering}. Let N be the random variable denoting the total
number of patients vary their preference ordering. By using
the properties of random variable, it can be written that
N =
∑n
i=1Ni. We wish to compute the expected number of
variations, and so we take the expectation both sides and by
linearity of expectation we can write E[N ] =
∑n
i=1E[Ni]
=
∑n
i=1(Pr{i
th patient varies preference ordering}) =∑n
i=1 1/8 = n/8. Here, Pr{i
th patient varies preference
ordering} is the probability that given a patient whether
he will vary his true preference ordering. The probability
of that is taken as 1/8 (small variation). If the number of
agents varies from 1/4 and 1/2, then the expected number
of patient that may vary their preference ordering can be
n/4 (medium variation), and n/2 (large variation) respectively.
In Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b-3d, it can be seen that the total
efficiency loss of the system in case of RanPAM is more
than the total efficiency loss of the system in case of TOAM
and TOAM-IComP respectively. This is due to the fact
that, dissimilar to the RanPAM, TOAM and TOAM-IComP
allocates the best possible doctors to the patients from their
revealed preference list. Due to this reason, the value returned
by equation 1 in case of TOAM and TOAM-IComP is very
small as compared to RanPAM. In Fig. 3a, when the agents
are varying (misreporting) their true preference ordering,
then the TEL of the patients in case of TOAM with large
variation (TOAM L-var) is more than the TEL in TOAM
with medium variation (TOAM M-var) is more than the TEL
in TOAM with small variation (TOAM S-var) is more than
the TEL in TOAM without variation. As it is natural from
the construction of the TOAM.
Considering the case of incomplete preferences in Fig.
3b-3d, when the subset of agents are varying their true
preference ordering, then the TEL of the patients in case of
TOAM-IComP with large variation (TOAM-IComP L-var)
is more than the TEL in TOAM-IComP with medium
variation (TOAM-IComP M-var) is more than the TEL in
TOAM-IComP with small variation (TOAM-IComP S-var) is
more than the TEL in TOAM-IComP without variation. As
this is evident from the construction of the TOAM-IComP.
Considering the case of our second parameter i.e NBA, in
Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b-4d, it can be seen that the NBA of the
system in case of RanPAM is less than the NBA of the
system in case of TOAM and TOAM-IComP respectively.
This is due to the fact that, dissimilar to the RanPAM, TOAM
and TOAM-IComP allocates the best possible doctors to the
patients from their preference list. In Fig. 4a, when the agents
are varying their true preference ordering, then the NBA of
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Fig. 3. Total efficiency loss for different scenarios
the patients in case of TOAM with large variation (TOAM
L-var) is less than the NBA in TOAM with medium variation
(TOAM M-var) is less than the NBA in TOAM with small
variation (TOAM S-var) is less than the NBA in TOAM
without variation. As it is natural from the construction of
the TOAM.
In Fig. 4b-4d, when the subset of agents are varying their
true preference ordering, then the NBA of the patients in
case of TOAM-IComP with large variation (TOAM-IComP
L-var) is less than the NBA in TOAM-IComP with medium
variation (TOAM-IComP M-var) is less than the NBA in
TOAM-IComP with small variation (TOAM-IComP S-var)
is less than the TEL in TOAM-IComP without variation. As
this is evident from the construction of the TOAM-IComP.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we studied the problem of hiring renowned
expert consultants (doctors) from around the world, to serve
BIG patients of our society under zero budget environment.
The work can be further extended to many different settings,
e.g. multiple doctors are allocated to a BIG patient in different
hospitals around the globe. The other interesting direction
is studying the discussed set-ups under budget constraints
environment.
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